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1.1  Introduction 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) may increase host country productivity 
through improved resource allocation, increased competition, and expan- 
sion of local capabilities through a transfer of (technological) know-how 
(e.g., Caves 1995; Wang and Blomstrom 1992). Expansion of local capa- 
bilities occurs if  FDI introduces superior organizational practices  and 
technologies and if this know-how spills over to and is assimilated by local 
suppliers and customers, the local workforce, and local rival firms. The 
scope for such spillovers depends on the underlying innovative capabilities 
of the investing firm, the degree to which these are transferred to the for- 
eign venture, and the extent of integration of the foreign firm into the host 
economy. In addition, a condition for substantial spillovers is  sufficient 
“absorptive capacity” of the local economy, for example, the sophistica- 
tion of local suppliers and the skill level of the workforce (Cohen and Lev- 
inthal 1990; Capannelli  1997a, 1997b). Integration in this context is the 
degree of interaction with the local workforce, local suppliers, customers, 
government institutions, industry  associations, educational institutions, 
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and research centers (Turok 1993; De Arcos et al. 1995; La11  1995). Since 
integration is achieved through country-specific investments in building 
relationships with the local economy, highly integrated foreign firms are 
less likely to divest in the future and the long-term viability of FDI in- 
creases. 
The empirical literature on spillovers and productivity growth has pro- 
duced mixed evidence on the impact of FDI. Industry-level studies have 
generally shown positive effects of FDT  on labor productivity (Globerman 
1978) and product and process innovations (Bertschek 1995). Firm- and 
establishment-level studies have given less support. Haddad and Harrison 
(1993) did not find evidence of productivity-increasing technology spill- 
overs from foreign-owned subsidiaries to local firms in Morocco.’ Aitken, 
Hanson, and Harrison (1997) found evidence of a more limited form of 
spillover from multinational investment in  Mexico. The presence of ex- 
porting multinational firms was found to increase the probability that do- 
mestically owned firms start export activities, suggesting the presence of 
spillovers in the form of informational externalities and access to overseas 
distribution channels. Okamoto (1997) and Chung, Mitchell, and Yeung 
(1996) failed to find a direct impact on the productivity of  North Ameri- 
can car component suppliers from their forward linkages with Japanese 
assemblers.2  These two studies did show substantial improvements in the 
productivity of US.-owned component suppliers (partly as a result of in- 
ventory reductions), suggesting that Japanese FDI had an indirect positive 
effect on productivity by  increasing c~mpetition.~  However, another re- 
cent study of the impact of Japanese FDI on the productivity of locally 
owned Chinese firms found almost opposite effects (Kinoshita 1996). Here 
the results did not support indirect spillover effects of FDI on local firms’ 
productivity but provided evidence that direct buyer or supplier linkages 
with foreign firms led to higher productivity levels. 
The debate about spillovers and other benefits from FDI appears to be 
particularly intense where it concerns Japanese FDI in Asia, which is the 
1. Although this conceivably may have been due to a relative lack of absorptive capacity 
of local firms. 
2. Okamoto (1997) failed to find productivity-increasing effects of supplier relationships 
with Japanese assemblers located in the United States throughout the 1980s but did obtain 
weakly significant coefficients in the early 1990s. 
3. The findings may also be taken to indicate that US.-owned firms have been able to 
increase productivity by  actively introducing organizational practices such as “just in time” 
delivery systems pioneered by Japanese automobile producers. It is conceivable that intro- 
duction of these practices was facilitated by  the “demonstration” effect of plants set up by 
Japanese assemblers and suppliers, which is a particular form of spillover. Similarly, Oliver 
and Wilkinson (1992) found that a majority of U.K. firms in their sample had succe~sfully 
introduced such “Japanese” manufacturing management practices as just-in-time delivery, 
quality circles, and flexible manufacturing techniques by  the early  1990s. The U.K. firms 
were able to emulate these practices after Japanese plants set up in the United Kingdom in 
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subject of this paper. One reason is the perception that Japanese FDI is 
somehow less likely to generate spillovers to local economies because of 
the idiosyncratic behavior of Japanese multinational firms. Another rea- 
son is the economic importance of the activities of Japanese multinational 
firms in Southeast Asian countries. As shown in table 1  .I, Japanese manu- 
facturing affiliates play a principal role in East Asian economies. In three 
ASEAN countries (Indonesia, Philippines, and Malaysia), Japanese firms 
are responsible for almost a third of employment in the electronics and 
transport machinery industries. 
In the discussion of the role of Japanese FDI, two contrasting views can 
be discerned. The positive view of Japanese FDI holds that it promotes eco- 
nomic development in Asia because the production processes and know- 
how transferred correspond closely to the absorptive capacity of the Asian 
economies. Products and components manufactured with the most stan- 
dardized and mature  technologies are produced  in the ASEAN  coun- 
tries and, more recently, China, where cheap and low-skilled labor is rela- 
tively abundant. Goods of intermediate technology are produced  in the 
newly industrialized economies (NIEs), where labor is more expensive but 
also  more  skilled.  The  most  technologically  advanced  and  capital- 
intensive production takes place in Japan. In this “flying wild geese” repre- 
sentation of Japanese FDI, Japan’s technological leadership pulls along 
the industrialization of other Asian economies (e.g., Yamazawa et al. 1993; 
Urata  1991). The specialized nature of Japanese FDI in different Asian 
countries in accordance with differences in comparative advantage pro- 
motes intraregional and intraindustry trade. In this view,  an important 
role is played by  the “regional core networks” established by  the larger 
Japanese  multinational  firms:  networks  of  interrelated  manufacturing 
plants for final goods and components, with different capital, labor, and 
skill intensities (Belderbos and Sleuwaegen 1996; Gold, Eonomou, and 
Tolentino 1991). 
A contrasting and less benign view of Japanese FDI points out that the 
centralized nature of management in Japanese multinational firms and the 
reliance of  Japanese firms on long-term dedicated supplier relationships 
discourages  substantial  integration  in  local  economies. Japanese  firms 
exercise strict control over overseas ventures  (Mason  and Encarnation 
1994), are slow in appointing local staff to managerial positions (Westney 
1996; Belderbos 1997), and are among the least internationalized in terms 
of overseas R&D activities (Pate1 1995). A number of studies have pre- 
sented evidence of relatively closed supply chains. Japanese affiliates in 
the United  States rely more on imported components from their parent 
companies than do other foreign investors (Graham and Krugman 1990; 
Froot 1991; Murray, Wildt, and Kotabe 1995), and Japanese affiliates in 
Australia rarely use open tenders for machinery procurement but routinely 
buy from long-standing suppliers in Japan (in contrast with European and Table 1.1  Share of Japanese Manufacturing Subsidiaries in Host Country Employment, 1995 
Electrical Machinery  Transport Machinery  All Manufacturing” 
Total  Employment of  Japanese Share  Total  Employment of  Japanese Share  Japanese Share 
Country  Employment  Japanese Subsidiaries  (%)  Employment  Japanese Subsidiaries  (“/I  (%I 
South Korea  436,385  12,740  2.9  3  14,000  7,908  2.5  1.2 
Taiwan  377,877  34,780  9.2  127,764  22,825  17.9  3.6 
Singapore  100,111  38,809  38.7  34,672  1,243  3.6  13.5 
Indonesia  132,484  49,373  37.3  123,842  42,510  34.3  1.8 
Philippines  118,560  45,106  38.0  n.a.  26,515  n.a.  3.6 
Malaysia  452,422  127,475  28.2  45,487  14,051  30.9  8.8 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on MITI (1998a) and Asian Development Bank (1998). 
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U.S.  affiliates; Kreinin 1992). Evidence on Japanese subsidiaries in the Ma- 
laysian electronics industry shows that Japanese firms buy an overwhelm- 
ing share of local components from Japanese-owned component suppliers, 
including those within the same corporate group or vertical keiretsu (Ca- 
pannelli (1993, 1997b).4  In a recent paper, Hackett and Srinivasan (1998) 
argued that Japanese firms face higher supplier-switching costs because of 
their intensive use of cooperative subcontractor relationships with estab- 
lished Japanese suppliers, in particular, suppliers within vertical keiretsu. 
This implies that Japanese firms are less eager to switch to local suppliers 
for their overseas manufacturing operations. Hackett and Srinivasan’s em- 
pirical evidence suggesting that Japanese firms are less inclined than U.S. 
firms to invest in countries that impose strict local content requirements 
on foreign investors is consistent with the hypothesis of higher switching 
costs. However, it appears to be an open question whether differences in 
investment and procurement behavior are due to the idiosyncratic organi- 
zation of Japanese multinational firms or are a temporary phenomenon 
due to a “vintage effect”: the relatively late internationalization of Japanese 
firms (Mody and Srinivasan 1997; Westney 1996;  Belderbos 1997,  chap. 10). 
In this paper, we contribute to the discussion by examining the determi- 
nants of Japanese firms’ decisions to establish vertical linkages in Asian 
economies. Vertical linkages, that is, the local content of manufacturing 
operations, have been a focal point of host country concern. Several Asian 
countries have instituted formal local content requirements for foreign in- 
vestors; others have made preferential investment status conditional on 
local content or have put informal pressure on foreign investors to extend 
their vertical linkages (Japan Machinery Center for Trade and Investment 
1997; Commission of the European Communities 1998). Local content 
rules exist because increased local content is believed to provide a number 
of benefits to the host economy. If increased local content is achieved by 
sourcing materials and components from local suppliers, it may involve 
transfer of know-how to, and promote growth of, the local supplying in- 
dustry. If local content is increased, on the other hand, through greater 
vertical integration of manufacturing operations (by producing more com- 
ponents in-house), it may be associated with an upgrading of employee 
skills, in particular, if the production of components is more technology 
and know-how intensive. In  either case, increased vertical linkages are 
likely to enhance the local employment and trade balance effects of the 
investment project. In addition, the increased cost of divestment associ- 
ated with greater investment and linkages to the local economy may posi- 
tively affect the longevity of FDI. 
In this paper we  analyze procurement behavior at the micro level, that 
4. Capannelli (1997b, 172-73)  estimated that a mere 6.4 percent of local procurement was 
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is,  at the level of individual firms, using subsidiary-level data from the 
Ministry of International Trade and Industry’s (MITI’s) 1992 survey of 
Japanese multinationals. We develop an empirical model that aims to ex- 
plain  the local content of  Asian manufacturing operations by  Japanese 
subsidiaries in the electrical and electronics industry. The model specifies 
determinants  at the parent,  subsidiary, and host country  levels. Three 
main determinants, among others, are included: the presence of local con- 
tent rules, the role of dedicated supplier linkages in vertical keiretsu, and 
the vintage effect. The effect of local content rules is measured at the sub- 
sidiary level, by  utilizing a  question  in  the MITI survey that  inquires 
whether such regulations were applied. The effect of supplier relationships 
within vertical keiretsu is measured directly by estimating for each parent 
firm the intensity of transactions within the vertical keiretsu in Japan. The 
vintage effect is taken into account by including a variable for the oper- 
ating experience of the subsidiary in the country of investment. The data 
set used contains information on 157 Asian subsidiaries in the electronics 
industry. The electronics industry is the largest Japanese investor in Asia 
and  makes  extensive use  of  subcontracting  relationships  outside  and 
within vertical keiretsu. However, empirical research on Japanese subcon- 
tracting relationships to date has focused almost solely on the automo- 
bile industry. 
Our main interest in this paper is the potential benefits of Japanese FDI 
for host economies that are derived from extended vertical linkages. The 
empirical analysis therefore focuses on the local (host country) content of 
electronics manufacturing subsidiaries  in Asia.  Local  content  includes 
both the value added of manufacturing subsidiaries (in-house production 
of components) and the value of components and materials sourced from 
local (Japanese and third country owned, as well as locally owned) suppli- 
ers. We chose not to focus on procurement alone because ignoring intra- 
subsidiary value added could lead to biased results: there is conceptually 
little difference between in-subsidiary production of components (value 
added)  and procurements  from  nearby  component  plants  of  affiliated 
firms belonging to the same vertical keiretsu. The difference could merely 
be one of legal subsidiary boundaries. On the other hand, a distinction be- 
tween procurements from locally owned suppliers and those from related 
suppliers would be useful because the former are likely to be associated 
with greater  technology transfer and the stimulation  of  local entrepre- 
neurship (e.g., Lim and Fong 1983). Unfortunately, our data do not allow 
us to estimate the importance of local procurement from locally owned 
firms.5 
5. The MITI data do contain information on procurement from subsidiaries owned by the 
same parent firm (“intragroup procurement” in the MITI terminology), which is a narrower 
definition than intra-keiretsu procurement. However, no distinction is made among procure- 
ments from third country, Japanese, and locally owned suppliers, and the question on intra- 
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 briefly 
reviews the literature on subcontracting and supplier relationships of Japa- 
nese firms and previous work on vertical linkages of foreign-owned affili- 
ates. Section 1.3  develops hypotheses concerning the determinants of the lo- 
cal content ratio of Japanese manufacturing operations in East Asia and 
describes the empirical model and data. Section 1.4 presents the empirical 
results. Section 1.5 summarizes our findings and offers concluding remarks. 
1.2  Previous Literature: Vertical Linkages, Japanese Supplier Networks, 
and Local Content Rules 
We  are not aware of any recent  systematic empirical analysis of the 
vertical linkages of foreign-owned firms in host economies. There is a re- 
search tradition on vertical linkages of foreign firms in the economic ge- 
ography literature. O’Farrell and O’Loughlin (198  l), for instance, statis- 
tically analyzed  local  procurement  levels of  foreign-owned affiliates in 
Ireland. In a more recent study, Turok (1993) investigated local sourcing 
by firms under foreign (including Japanese) ownership in the Scottish elec- 
tronics industry (“Silicon Glen”) in 1992 and concluded that the level of 
vertical linkage was low.6 The only recent attempt to provide a more com- 
prehensive explanation  of local sourcing decisions in this tradition was 
Reid (1 999,  but this study was primarily concerned with the effect of just- 
in-time delivery systems on the spatial clustering of suppliers. Reid found 
that the use of just-in-time systems by 239 Japanese-owned manufacturing 
plants in the United States is positively associated with the proportion of 
material inputs procured  at the county level (but not at the state or na- 
tional levels). 
Apart from the descriptive evidence presented in Kreinin (1  992), Gra- 
ham and Krugman (1990), and Froot (1991), which emphasized the reli- 
ance of Japanese overseas affiliates on component and material imports 
from Japan, a number of (case) studies have examined local procurement 
by Japanese firms. Hiramoto (1992) presented a case study of the subcon- 
tracting and sourcing relationships of Japanese television and VCR assem- 
blers in Asia and Europe. He found that Japanese assemblers have often 
failed in their attempts to establish long-lasting subcontracting relation- 
ships with local parts suppliers similar to those they have with Japanese 
suppliers. Major obstacles were the lack of an orientation toward continu- 
ous improvement, the lack of emphasis on quality and reliability, the dom- 
inant position of  the assembler-buyer, and the buyer’s preference for the 
use of relatively ambiguous contracts. Belderbos (1997, chap. 8) examined 
aggregate data on procurement and value added of Japanese electronics 
subsidiaries in the European Union and the United States. While the local 
6.  Only 12 percent of components were supplied from Scotland and another 30 percent 
from the rest of the United Kingdom (Turok 1993, 406). 16  Rene Belderbos, Giovanni Capannelli, and Kyoji Fukao 
(European and North American)  content  of manufacturing operations 
was substantial (in the range of 40 to 60 percent), the role of locally owned 
firms in the supply chain was limited. Comparable findings were obtained 
by Capannelli (1993, 1997b) for Malaysia. These results are consistent with 
earlier work by Lim and Fong (1982) for Japanese investors in Singapore. 
On the other hand, there is some evidence that  reliance on in-house 
components and procurement from Japanese affiliates is declining. Baba 
and Hatashima (1995) and Chia (1995) argued that there has been a recent 
move from the use of firm-specific components developed internally or 
within the vertical keiretsu toward the open purchase of standard compo- 
nents. Greater competitive pressures have forced Japanese firms to rede- 
sign products  in  order  to facilitate  the procurement  of  cheaper mass- 
produced components in Asia. Baba and Hatashima (1995) described a 
number of cases in which Japanese electronics firms have extended local 
design activities in Southeast Asia.7  Chia (1995) showed that an increasing 
number  of Japanese  firms have  set up regional  procurement offices in 
Singapore to facilitate cost-effective  sourcing of components made in Asia. 
Recent empirical work on Japanese FDI has explored the role of sup- 
plier and subcontractor linkages in the decision to invest abroad and the 
location of investments. Belderbos and Sleuwaegen (1996) found that ver- 
tical linkages between firms are an important factor in the decision to in- 
vest in Asia: subcontractor firms within vertical keiretsu are more likely to 
invest in Asia if the parent firm operates a large number of plants (a “re- 
gional core network”) in the region. Using location data on Japanese man- 
ufacturing affiliates in the United States, Head, Ries, and Swenson (1995) 
found that Japanese plants were more likely to be set up in a state, the 
greater the number of existing Japanese plants in that state in the same 
industry. The existence of plants set up by parent firms or suppliers in the 
same vertical automobile keiretsu exerted an additional positive effect on 
location decisions by firms in the keiretsu. Horiuchi (1 989) and Cusumano 
and Takeishi (1991) reported that Japanese automobile manufacturers ac- 
tively help their keiretsu component suppliers to set up plants near their 
assembly operations abroad. 
Empirical work on Japanese subcontracting and buyer-supplier relation- 
ships has been concerned primarily with establishing the role of risk shar- 
ing as well as the correlation between relationship-specific investments and 
the performance of  suppliers and assemblers. These studies have focused 
on the automobile industry. Asanuma and Kikutani (1992) and Okamuro 
7. Matsushita Electric and Seiko Epson are reported to have recently transferred part of 
their die-making activities to Southeast Asia in order to reduce costs and reduce the period 
from design to delivery of new models. Matsushita Electric makes dies for television parts 
and cabinets in Singapore and Malaysia, and Seiko Epson is producing dies for computer 
printers in Hong Kong. See “Manufacturing Technology Leaving Its Stamp on Asia,” Nikkei 
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(1995) provided evidence that the intensity of long-term supply relation- 
ships is positively correlated with the stability of performance. Dyer (1996) 
found  evidence  that  automobile  assemblers  are  more  profitable,  the 
greater the proximity (spatial clustering) of their suppliers. Proximity is 
associated with suppliers’ dedicated investment in production  facilities, 
greater sharing of know-how, and more intense communication. These are 
found to be correlated with faster design changes, improved quality, and 
increased return on investment. For the consumer electronics industry, Ca- 
pannelli  (1997a) found that  technology  transfer  by  Japanese  assembly 
firms to their input suppliers is positively related to specific investments 
to enhance the former’s technological capability and the latter’s absorptive 
capacity and negatively related to the bargaining power of suppliers. The 
effectiveness of technology transfer was found to be greater in the case of 
lower end production inputs. 
Studies of component procurement and supply chain management in 
the strategic management literature have also focused on the relation be- 
tween  sourcing  strategies  and firm  performance.  Kotabe  and  Omura 
(I  989) examined sourcing strategies of a group of foreign (including Japa- 
nese) multinational firms in the United States and found that the extent of 
internal sourcing of major components is positively related to U.S. market 
performance of the product. Murray et al. (1995) surveyed 104 foreign- 
affiliated manufacturing  subsidiaries  in the United  States in  1993 and 
found weak evidence that reliance on nonstandardized components and in- 
ternal sourcing was related to better market performance as measured by 
sales growth. They also reported significant differences in procurement be- 
havior between European- and Japanese-owned subsidiaries in the United 
States in 1991. Japanese subsidiaries sourced a significantly smaller share 
of the value of components in the United States and combined greater 
reliance on nonstandardized components with significantly higher levels 
of intrafirm sourcing. 
A last research tradition has been concerned with formal analysis of the 
welfare and strategic effects of local content requirements (e.g., Belderbos 
and Sleuwaegen 1997; Jie-A-Joen, Belderbos, and Sleuwaegen 1998; Rich- 
ardson 1993). The effect of local content requirements has been found to 
depend on, among other things, the market power of local parts suppliers, 
the cost competitiveness and level of vertical integration of local competi- 
tors in the assembly industry, and whether the requirements induce FDI 
in component production. Despite the wealth of theoretical  studies, the 
only empirical study of the effect of content regulations is Hackett and 
Srinivasan (1998). Their finding that local content regulations exert a sig- 
nificantly negative effect on Japanese FDI would imply that, on balance, 
the negative effect on FDI in assembly industries is much stronger than 
any positive effect on FDI by  assemblers and related suppliers in  local 
component production  to satisfy the requirements.  However, they also 18  Rent5 Belderbos, Giovanni Capannelli, and Kyoji Fukao 
found a positive and significant effect of the stock of Japanese FDI on new 
investments. This is consistent with the finding of  strong agglomeration 
economies by  Head et al. (1995) and may  in fact measure a partly off- 
setting positive effect on FDI by  subcontractors in response to previous 
investments by assemblers facing local content regulations. 
1.3  Data and Empirical Model 
This section develops an empirical model explaining the extent of verti- 
cal linkages of Japanese manufacturing subsidiaries in Asia. The depen- 
dent variable is the local content ratio (LOCON), defined as sales of the 
subsidiary, minus components and materials imported from abroad, di- 
vided by subsidiary sales.*  Since the dependent variable is restricted to the 
interval [0,1], two-limit Tobit analysis is used to relate the local content 
ratio to a set of explanatory variables. 
We  first introduce the data set and discuss the use of  the dependent 
variable. This is followed by  a discussion of the explanatory variables at 
the parent firm and subsidiary levels. We will start by estimating a set of 
empirical models including these variables while controlling for country 
characteristics through a set of country dummies. This helps us to focus 
on the estimates of variables at the level  of the firm. Since our data set 
only includes nine Asian countries, the variation is  not large enough to 
allow inclusion of a comprehensive set of country variables. Nevertheless, 
in a second set of extended models we do employ a set of country variables 
expected to have an impact on local content. Country variables are dis- 
cussed in the last part of subsection 1.3.3. 
1.3.1  Data 
Subsidiary data are drawn from MITI’s 1992 basic survey of Japanese 
multinational  enterprises and account  for operations in  the fiscal year 
through March 1993. A representative number of  157 subsidiaries in the 
electronics industry had sufficient information on local content and a ba- 
sic set of explanatory variables. Eighty-three of these were established in 
the four NIEs and 67 in the ASEAN-4 countries (Indonesia, Thailand, 
Philippines, and Malaysia), and, 7 subsidiaries operated in China. Further 
details on the data selection as well  as the definitions of the dependent 
and explanatory variables are provided in the appendix. 
Table 1.2 shows the origins of procurements by Asian electronics sub- 
sidiaries of Japanese firms. Japan is the most important origin of procure- 
ments (46 percent), followed by  the host country (39 percent) and other 
Asian countries (12 percent). Asian countries other than Japan are impor- 
tant sources of parts and components for subsidiaries in the ASEAN-4 
8. When a subsidiary also imported finished goods, we deducted the value of such imports 
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Table 1.2  Distribution of Procurement by Asian Manufacturing Subsidiaries of 
Japanese Electronics Firms over Regions of Origin, 1992 
Local  Japan  Asia  Other  Subsidiaries 
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43  15 
43  6 
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44  16 
42  42 
55  15 
47  17 
72  0 

























Source: Authors’ calculations based on MITI (1994). 
Note:  From  188 subsidiaries with complete imformation  (see appendix).  Percentages are 
shares of total procurement. 
Table 1.3  Local Content Ratio of Asian Manufacturing Subsidiaries of Japanese 
Electronics Firms, 1992 (percent) 
Local Procurement / Sales  Value Added / Sales  Local Content Ratio 


















































Source  Authors’ cdlculations based on MITI (1994) 
Note  From 188 subsidiaries with complete information (see appendix) 
countries, Singapore, and Hong Kong, but less so for Taiwan, South Ko- 
rea, and China. 
Table 1.3 shows the average local content ratio by country. The local 
content ratio averaged 71 percent for the NIEs and 56 percent for the 
ASEAN-4 countries. Higher local content ratios in the NIEs are achieved 20  Rene Belderbos, Giovanni Capannelli, and Kyoji Fukao 
through both greater local sourcing (28 percent) and higher value added 
(43 percent). 
1.3.2  Dependent Variable 
Foreign-owned subsidiaries can achieve higher local content in a num- 
ber of ways: (1) increasing the value added of the assembly activity, (2) in- 
creasing  intrasubsidiary  production  of  components,  (3) increasing  pro- 
curement of  components  and materials  from Japanese  suppliers in the 
same keiretsu that are producing in local plants, (4) increasing procure- 
ment from locally established independent Japanese firms, (5) increasing 
procurement  from local subsidiaries  of  third country firms,  and (6) in- 
creasing  procurement  from locally  owned  suppliers.  The local content 
ratio of a subsidiary measures how much value its activity creates in the 
local economy, that is, to what extent the value chain is established locally. 
However, a potential measurement problem  is associated with the local 
procurement share of the local content ratio. In particular, when local sup- 
pliers are foreign owned, these suppliers in turn will source part of their 
subcomponents and materials from abroad. The value added that is gener- 
ated locally must be less than the price paid for the components. Hence, 
our local content measure (and the figures in table 1.3) overestimates the 
contribution  to the local economy. There is evidence that this overstate- 
ment of actual local content is not negligible. Belderbos (1997, 326) re- 
ported  that  the local content ratio of  Japanese  electronics  subsidiaries 
drops from 66 to 55 percent if the non-European content of components 
manufactured by Japanese suppliers in the European Union is deducted. 
Although this is an important qualification to our analysis, it is less likely 
to introduce a systematic bias into the empirical results concerning  the 
determinants of local content. At the country level, the same factors that 
positively affect value added of final goods manufacturing will also have 
a positive impact on the value added of locally manufactured components. 
We did not find evidence that the local content of the electronic compo- 
nent subsidiaries in our sample is determined  differently from the local 
content of final goods sub~idiaries.~  Hence, our measured local content 
ratio and actual local content will be strongly correlated. 
A Japanese firm’s decisions concerning the sourcing of components and 
materials for its manufacturing operations in Asia can be subdivided into 
two decision problems: (1) whether to procure the components in-house 
(or intra-keiretsu) and (2) whether to procure the components in Japan or 
overseas (in Asia). The “internalization” decision of problem 1 reflects the 
trade-off  between the quality and reliability benefits of in-house produc- 
9. In addition, our results appeared robust with respect to the choice of the dependent 
variable (including or excluding value added): we  obtained very similar results with local 
procurement  as the dependent variable. If the local procurement share of  measured local 
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tion of components of proprietary design versus the cost reduction bene- 
fits of sourcing standard components. If a firm chooses external sourcing 
of components to maintain a competitive cost structure, it will  be more 
likely to choose components produced in low-cost Asian locations (pro- 
duced by  locally owned firms or independent Japanese transplants). If  a 
firm chooses proprietary component manufacturing, it is still possible that 
overseas manufacturing activities reach high local content levels. A condi- 
tion is that the overseas manufacturing location allow cost-effective pro- 
duction of the components within the assembly plant or in a dedicated 
component manufacturing subsidiary established by the assembler or its 
related component suppliers. The local content level reached will therefore 
reflect both the importance of  transactions costs associated with arm’s- 
length trade and the attractiveness of Asian countries in component man- 
ufacturing. 
1.3.3  Explanatory Variables 
Parent Firm Level 
We  posit that the R&D intensity of the parent firm, R&DINT, has a 
negative effect on local content. R&D-intensive firms make greater use of 
proprietary designs and in-house know-how, and they possess more intan- 
gible assets related to capabilities in the manufacture of high-technology 
components. They are less likely to transfer the production of these com- 
ponents  to external suppliers.  Since production  of  in-house developed 
components is generally capital and technology intensive, it is less likely 
that Asian manufacturing locations provide substantial cost advantages 
for R&D-intensive firms. There is some evidence for this assertion: Fukao 
et al. (1994) found that R&D intensity has a significantly negative impact 
on the stock of FDI in Asia by Japanese electronics firms. We hypothesize 
that R&DINT is negatively correlated with the local content ratio. We 
also test whether the effect is  stronger for the ASEAN-4 countries and 
China compared to the NIEs since the greater technological capabilities 
of the latter make them more attractive for R&D-intensive manufactur- 
ing operations. 
Japanese firms differ in the intensity of long-term cooperative subcon- 
tracting and supplier-assembler relationships (e.g., Sako 1992; Dyer 1996). 
In particular, firms that are member of large vertical keiretsu with a sub- 
stantial number of related component manufacturers will make intensive 
use  of  these relationships. Intra-keiretsu procurement is based on long- 
term relationships characterized by intensive interaction between supplier 
and assembler involving dedicated investments in equipment and human 
resources and requires the implementation of just-in-time delivery and to- 
tal quality control systems. There is evidence that these relationships en- 
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1992; Okamuro 1995). Since the assembler-supplier system is  one of the 
bases for the competitiveness of Japanese firms, they have followed a strat- 
egy  of  emulating it abroad. In practice, however,  it has proved difficult 
to involve locally owned suppliers in such relationships (Hiramoto 1992). 
Moreover, supplier-switching  costs are higher for keiretsu firms given the 
sunk investments in existing relationships with Japanese suppliers (Hack- 
ett and Srinivasan 1998). Supplier networks have therefore often been rep- 
licated  abroad  through  the  establishment  of  overseas  manufacturing 
plants by  existing Japanese manufacturers of  parts and components, in 
which the latter were often assisted by the “core” firm of the keiretsu (Bel- 
derbos and Sleuwaegen 1996). 
The consequences of keiretsu membership for the local content of over- 
seas operations are not unambiguous. On the one hand, the higher switch- 
ing costs of keiretsu member firms may lead to a greater continuing reli- 
ance on inputs  from long-standing suppliers located in  Japan.  On the 
other hand, if  the supplier has followed the assembler abroad, keiretsu 
firms may  be able to reach higher local content than independent firms. 
The possibility of replicating supplier networks abroad may be a particular 
advantage in locations where local or third country component manufac- 
turers are lacking. We  therefore examine whether  the effect of  keiretsu 
intensity is stronger in countries that have less developed indigenous elec- 
tronic parts industries, such as the ASEAN-4 countries and China. 
Since a substantial share of investment in Asia is done by the core firms 
of keiretsu or by  member firms of keiretsu, membership in a vertical kei- 
retsu itself is not a distinctive characteristic. Instead, we devised a measure 
of the intensity of supplier-assembler relationships. We used Toyo Keizai’s 
publication Nihon no Kigyou  Guruupu (Japanese Corporate Groups), to 
establish for each Japanese investor whether it belonged to a vertical kei- 
retsu. Then we  proxied the intensity of  supplier-assembler relationships 
for keiretsu members by taking the ratio of the size (measured by  paid-in 
capital) of all Japanese subsidiaries and related firms in  manufacturing 
(kogaisha and kankeigaisha) to the size of the core firm of the keiretsu in 
Japan. We  call this variable keiretsu intensity, KEIRINT. The values for 
KEIRINT corresponded well to our intuition concerning the strength of 
supplier networks, with, for example, the highest ratios for Matsushita and 
Fujitsu and the lowest for Sharp. Unfortunately, we  were not able to iden- 
tify  keiretsu  intensity  for  all  Japanese investors,  and  the  inclusion of 
KEIRINT reduces the number of valid observations by seventeen. 
Subsidiary Level 
At  the subsidiary level, experience in manufacturing in  a country  is 
likely  to be an important determinant of the extent of vertical linkages. 
Finding suitable local suppliers and establishing links with these firms is 
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mands of Japanese assemblers in terms of quality and delivery schedules. 
In other cases, redesign of  the product is necessary to allow the use of 
locally made standardized components. O’Farrell and O’Loughlin (198 1) 
found a positive effect of operating experience on the level of local pro- 
curement by  foreign-owned subsidiaries in Ireland, but Reid (1995) could 
not establish a similar effect for Japanese firms in the United States. One 
reason for the latter result may be that no distinction was made between 
greenfield establishments and acquisitions. In cases where a local subsid- 
iary was acquired by  a Japanese investor, it is natural to assume that the 
subsidiary was relatively deeply embedded in  the local economy at the 
time of the acquisition; the number of years of operation under Japanese 
ownership is not likely to have an important additional impact on local 
content. In fact, it is conceivable that under Japanese ownership, a restruc- 
turing of manufacturing activities takes place, which may involve a switch 
to the use of Japanese-made components. In our analysis of Japanese sub- 
sidiaries in Asia, the distinction between acquisitions and greenfield plants 
is of very limited importance because the role of acquisitions in Asia is 
marginal: only four subsidiaries in the sample were acquired. This small 
number does not allow us to test for a different effect of experience for ac- 
quired firms. We  therefore use only one variable, EXPER, the number of 
months since operations started in the manufacturing subsidiary under Jap- 
anese 
As mentioned above, the entry mode is likely to have an impact on inte- 
gration in  the  local economy. Acquired  subsidiaries are likely  to have 
higher local content given their local ownership and preacquisition op- 
erating experience. We  also expect that joint ventures facilitate higher lev- 
els of local content than wholly owned subsidiaries, ceteris paribus. This 
is because the local joint venture partner or its related firms may have ac- 
cumulated expertise either in electronic component manufacturing or in 
procuring components  from local suppliers. Taking the wholly  owned 
greenfield subsidiary as the base case, we include two dummy variables in 
the model, ACQUIS when the subsidiary was acquired and JV  when the 
subsidiary is a joint venture with a local partner. 
A feature of the operations of Japanese electronics firms in Asia is a 
certain dichotomy between subsidiaries producing for export markets and 
subsidiaries primarily selling on the local market. The export versus local 
sales strategy may have an impact on vertical linkages of the subsidiary. If 
the subsidiary focuses on the local market it is likely that (1) it produces 
relatively mature and low-priced products for this local market and not 
the most sophisticated products or models and (2) it has an incentive to 
10. We  tested a model that included both EXPER for greenfield and EXPER for acquired 
firms. As expected, the latter had a small and insignificant coefficient, while the coefficient 
of the former was only marginally different from the EXPER coefficient for all subsidiaries. 24  Ren6 Belderbos, Giovanni Capannelli, and Kyoji Fukao 
adapt the products to local tastes and circumstances. The more mature 
the products, the more likely it is that locally produced low-cost standard 
components can be used. Adapting products to the local market is likely 
to involve redesign, which allows the use of  locally made components. 
Furthermore,  subsidiaries selling price-sensitive products  on  the  local 
market are more vulnerable to currency swings if they rely on procurement 
from Japan. In sum, we  expect that subsidiaries with higher local sales 
ratios have higher local content. LOCSALES measures the percentage of 
subsidiary turnover destined for the local market. We expect this positive 
effect to be greatest for the ASEAN-4 countries and China, where demand 
is less sophisticated than in the NIEs. 
Industry characteristics will have an effect on the extent of vertical link- 
ages. High local content ratios may be  more difficult to achieve in high- 
technology industries such as telecommunications than in the more ma- 
ture consumer goods sectors. Subsidiaries manufacturing products that 
use components with a low value-to-weight ratio will be more inclined to 
use local components because transportation costs associated with im- 
ports are relatively high. We  control for such possible systematic differ- 
ences by  including industry dummies. We regrouped the industry classifi- 
cation used in the  MITI survey into four subclasses in the electronics 
industry: consumer goods, semiconductors and electronic parts, telecom- 
munications and computer equipment, and other electronic and electrical 
equipment. We use consumer goods as the reference case and include three 
dummies: TELCOMP, PARTS, and OTHERIND. 
Country Level 
The first country characteristic affecting local integration is the avail- 
ability of  locally established component  suppliers. We  used  data from 
Elsevier’s Yearbook of World Electronics Data to calculate the value ofelec- 
tronic parts and component production in each country in  1992 (Elsevier 
1995). As explanatory variable we  took the natural logarithm of the pro- 
duction  value,  SUPPLIERS.  The  variable SUPPLIERS  measures the 
availability of locally owned suppliers as well as Japanese-owned suppliers. 
It will  also generally reflect the attractiveness of a country as a place to 
establish component manufacturing operations. 
The extent to which Japanese suppliers play a role in the local compo- 
nent industry will also affect vertical linkages. By using long-standing sup- 
pliers from Japan established near the overseas manufacturing base, firms 
can avoid switching costs and emulate best practice in Japan. There may 
be important economies of agglomeration once a substantial number of 
Japanese suppliers have set up local manufacturing subsidiaries. Reduced 
input costs can result from increased specialization and training of local 
personnel. We  used MTTI  survey data to establish the total turnover of 
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1992. We  employ as an indicator of the presence of  Japanese suppliers, 
JRATIO, the log of  total turnover by  Japanese subsidiaries divided by 
SUPPLIERS. We also hypothesize that firms with extensive supplier link- 
ages within their keiretsu in Japan are likely to benefit most from the avail- 
ability of Japanese suppliers. Hence we  test for the cross-effect of JRATIO 
and KEIRINT. 
The cost advantage of using a local network of suppliers also depends 
on the quality of  infrastructure.  Good infrastructure  facilitates physical 
transport of components within the country and communication between 
assembler and suppliers. The perceived quality of infrastructure, as mea- 
sured by  a survey of U.S. multinational firms conducted by  Business In- 
ternational corporation, has been found to have a significantly positive 
impact  on inward investment (Wheeler and  Mody  1992;  Hackett  and 
Srinivasan 1998). We  use the rating provided by  Business International 
(1989) as an indicator of  the quality of  infrastructure in 1989: INFRA 
measures this quality on a scale of 0 to 10. We include INFRA as a moder- 
ating factor  on the effect of SUPPLIERS. Hence we  include SUPPLI- 
ERS * INFRA. 
An important issue is to what extent local content rules directed at in- 
creasing the local content of  (foreign-owned) manufacturing operations 
are successful in enhancing vertical linkages. We examined in some detail 
the available information at the country level on local content regulations 
and import restrictions on components and materials (Japan Machinery 
Center  for  Trade  and Investment  1997;  Commission of  the  European 
Communities 1998). We  found that very few formal rules specifying local 
content requirements applied to the electronics industry. Most existing 
requirements apply  to  automobile  and machinery manufacturing.  The 
only country that regularly imposes local content and export performance 
requirements on foreign-owned firms is China; often these are part of 
trade-balancing requirements that link import restrictions to export per- 
formance. In some ASEAN-4 countries, preferential treatment  given  to 
foreign investment projects is contingent on local content (among other 
requirements). Malaysia, for instance, grants “pioneer status” (a right to 
tax exemptions) if  the investment meets a number of conditions, among 
which are local content requirements. In Indonesia import tariff reduc- 
tions can be made dependent on local content. Overall, we concluded that 
import requirements and local content rules in Asia, if applied, are mostly 
part of incentive schemes. Such schemes and the conditions vary with each 
investment project, and this introduces a degree of discretion into the ap- 
plication of local content rules. The schemes may link import restrictions 
or local content requirements to export requirements. 
Based on these findings, we  decided to use two alternative indicators of 
local content requirements: besides an indicator of  local content require- 
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vidual subsidiary. At the country level, the presence and strictness of lo- 
cal content regulations and import restrictions is measured by  the rat- 
ings given by U.S. multinational firms provided by  Business International 
(1  989). We averaged the ratings for the extent of component and material 
import restrictions and the use of local content requirements to construct 
the variable REGULATION. When local content requirements and im- 
port restrictions are made contingent on export requirements, subsidiaries 
with a local sales orientation will  face stricter requirements than export- 
oriented firms. To control for this characteristic, we  also include the cross- 
effect  of  LOCSALES and  REGULATION.  Both  the  cross-effect and 
REGULATION are expected to have a positive effect on the local con- 
tent ratio. 
The subsidiary-specific  indicator of local content requirements is taken 
from the MITI survey. Subsidiaries are asked to indicate whether local 
content rules affect their manufacturing operations. If they indicate yes, 
the dummy variable for  subsidiary-specific local content  requirements, 
REGUSUB, takes the value one. Because REGUSUB varies by  subsid- 
iary,  we  also include the  variable in  the  country  dummy  model.  The 
dummy variable REGUSUB has the disadvantage that it does not indicate 
the strictness of the requirements. Given that local content rules tend to 
be  stricter in the ASEAN-4 countries and China than in  the NIEs, we 
attempted to remedy this to some extent by including REGUSUB sepa- 
rately for both groups of countries. We expect a stronger positive effect of 
REGUSUB for the ASEAN-4 countries and China. In addition, we  in- 
clude the cross-effect of REGUSUB and LOCSALES to test whether sub- 
sidiaries with a local sales orientation face stricter requirements. 
1.4  Empirical Results 
After presenting the results of the country dummy model, we  analyze 
the results of the model with country variables. Finally, the results of  a 
number of tests are discussed. 
1.4.1  Country Dummy Model 
Table  1.4 shows the results of five Tobit models explaining the local 
content ratios of Asian manufacturing subsidiaries of Japanese electronics 
firms. The first two equations do not include KEIRINT and are estimates 
based on 157 observations. Equation (1) is used as the basic model while 
equation (2) tests whether procurement behavior differs between subsidi- 
aries located in  the NIEs and those located in  the ASEAN-4 countries 
and China. Equations (3), (4), and (5) include KEIRINT its inclusion re- 
duces the number of observations to 133. 
In accordance with our expectations, the parent firm’s R&D intensity 
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nonstandardized and technology-intensive components, often developed 
and produced by  the firm in Japan. There is no evidence, on the other 
hand, that this effect is significantly stronger in  the ASEAN-4 countries 
and China. The estimated coefficients for R&DINT do not differ markedly 
in equation (2), while the standard error of the separate estimates is sub- 
stantially higher. 
The results show a robust positive and significant effect of  operating 
experience on the local content ratio. Operating experience in the host 
country increases the vertical linkages of  subsidiaries in  the local econ- 
omy, because the switch to local suppliers and the process of  adaptation 
to the new environment require time. However, the estimated coefficient 
of EXPER suggests that this effect in itself is limited: one additional year 
(twelve months) of local operating experience increases the local content 
ratio by  0.6 percentage points. The results can only be taken as partial 
confirmation of the role of Japanese firms’ relatively late internationaliza- 
tion in procurement behavior. 
Our expectation that the entry mode of the subsidiary has an impact 
on the input-sourcing strategy is partly confirmed. Both ACQUIS and JV 
consistently have positive signs, but their significance is low. ACQUIS is 
significant (at the 10 percent level) in equation (1). 
The hypothesis that local content increases if  sales are destined for the 
local market is confirmed by  the positive and significant coefficient of 
LOCSALES in equation (1). The results of equations (2), (3), and (5) show 
that this effect is largely driven by the procurement behavior of subsidiar- Local Content of Japanese Electronics Manufacturing  29 
ies in the ASEAN-4 countries and China: LOCSALES is significant for 
subsidiaries in these countries but insignificant for subsidiaries located in 
the NIEs. This suggests that for countries with relatively unsophisticated 
markets, focusing on local markets helps subsidiaries to achieve lower de- 
pendence on imports of technology-intensive parts and components. 
REGUSUB, the variable indicating local content requirements at the 
subsidiary level, has a positive sign but is  insignificant in equation (1). 
However, if  the effect is split between the NIEs and the ASEAN-4 coun- 
tries and China, it appears that these requirements have an insignificant 
effect on the local content ratio of subsidiaries located in the former coun- 
tries but a positive and significant impact on that of subsidiaries in the 
latter. This indicates that relatively strict local content requirements have 
changed procurement behavior in the ASEAN-4 countries and China but 
such restrictions play no role in influencing sourcing decisions of subsid- 
iaries in the NIEs. In equation (4), it is also tested whether local content 
regulations have a greater impact on subsidiaries selling on local markets. 
The cross-effect of LOCSALES and REGUSUB is positive and signif- 
icant,  suggesting  that  local-market-oriented  subsidiaries  indeed  face 
stricter requirements. Inclusion of the cross-effect increases the standard 
errors of the coefficients of LOCSALES and REGUSUB, which become 
insignificant. 
The effects of the inclusion of the keiretsu intensity variable, KEIRINT, 
in equation (3)  confirm that keiretsu linkages have a major impact on verti- 
cal integration and local procurement. KEIRINT has a positive sign and 
is highly significant. Moreover, inclusion of  KEIRINT clearly improves 
the fit of the model: the x2  increases by  a substantial margin. Separating 
the effect of KEIRINT for subsidiaries in the NIEs and subsidiaries in the 
ASEAN-4 countries and China in equation  (5) shows a slightly higher 
coefficient for the NIEs. Hence, we  do not find evidence that keiretsu firms 
are able to reach higher local content ratios in countries with less devel- 
oped local supply infrastructures. Perhaps investments in local manufac- 
turing plants by  keiretsu suppliers are also less viable in these countries 
than in the NIEs. 
After controlling for subsidiary and parent firm characteristics, there is 
not  much  additional variation in  local content ratios across countries. 
Only the dummy for Taiwan is consistently significant (at the 10 percent 
level), indicating that Taiwanese subsidiaries reach higher ratios than sub- 
sidiaries in Hong Kong, ceteris paribus. The coefficient of the Indonesia 
dummy is positive and significant at the 10 percent level in equation (l), 
but this appears to be related to the local sales orientation of Indonesian 
subsidiaries  and  stricter  local  content  requirements.  The  Indonesia 
dummy becomes insignificant if the models include separate (and higher) 
estimates for local sales orientation and local content rules in the ASEAN- 
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Nor does the industry  of  the  subsidiary exert a strong independent 
influence on  the  local  content  ratio.  The  coefficients for  TELCOMP, 
PARTS, and OTHERIND are negatively signed, indicating that subsidiar- 
ies producing consumer goods tend to have higher local content, but the 
coefficients are not significant. 
We conclude that the results generally confirm our hypotheses concern- 
ing the effects of parent firm and subsidiary characteristics on local con- 
tent. Almost all coefficients have the predicted signs and reach conven- 
tional significance levels in most equations; for subsidiary-specific local 
content regulations and local sales orientation  this only applies to the 
ASEAN-4 countries and China. The only unexpected result is the lack of 
geographic differentiation in the effects of R&D intensity and keiretsu in- 
tensity. 
1.4.2  Country Variable Model 
Table 1.5 shows the estimated coefficients of equations (6) through (lo), 
which include host country variables. A general observation is that the 
estimated effects for most parent  and subsidiary variables do not differ 
markedly from the estimates of the country dummy model. R&DINT and 
EXPER remain significant, ACQUIS is significant at the 10 percent level 
in all equations, and REGUSUB (eqs. [7], [9], and [lo]) and LOCSALES 
(eqs. [9] and [lo]) remain positive and significant for the ASEAN-4 coun- 
tries and China. 
The results for the host country variables are generally less unambigu- 
ous. In equation (6),  the size of the host country's electronic parts industry, 
SUPPLIERS, has the expected positive sign but is far from significant. 
SUPPLIERS does affect local procurement conditional on good quality 
of host country  infrastructure: SUPPLIERS * INFRA becomes signifi- 
cant in equation (7). 
In equation (8), the country-specific indicator of local content regula- 
tions and import restrictions, REGULATION, is substituted for REGU- 
SUB. In addition, the cross-effect of REGULATION and LOCSALES is 
included. REGULATION has the expected positive sign but is insignifi- 
cant, while its cross-effect with LOCSALES is insignificant with the wrong 
(negative) sign." Taken together with the results for REGUSUB, this sug- 
gests that local content regulations vary considerably between foreign sub- 
sidiaries in a country and have a greater impact on the procurement be- 
havior of specific subsidiaries (presumably those that apply for some form 
of favorable investment status) rather than affecting local content of all in- 
vestors. 
In equation (9), the indicator for the presence of  Japanese suppliers, 
11. Nor does REGULATION reach significance if the cross-effect with LOCSALES is 
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JRATIO, is introduced. It has the expected positive sign but is not signifi- 
cant. Nor does the inclusion of cross-effects of KEIRINT with SUPPLI- 
ERS and JRATIO in equation (10) give significant effects.I2  In light of the 
strong positive effect of the KEIRINT variable, these results are puzzling. 
Given the higher switching costs for firms with intensive intra-keiretsu sup- 
plier relationships, we expected the positive effect of KEIRINT to work 
through the replication of keiretsu supplier networks abroad. We can think 
of a number of reasons why  the results do not bring this out. First, the 
variable JRATIO may not be an accurate proxy for the strength of the lo- 
cal Japanese supply base. JRATIO is derived from MITI survey data with 
a limited response rate, and response rates may differ by country. Further- 
more, JRATIO measures sales of responding component subsidiaries and 
hence includes exports, while export-oriented subsidiaries may not have 
been set up to supply local manufacturers. We are not able at this point to 
remedy these potential problems. Second, we may not be able to estimate 
country variable effects precisely enough because the number of countries 
(seven) in our country variable model is small. Third, in theory we should 
include an indicator for the local presence of suppliers within the same 
keiretsu instead of a proxy for the presence of Japanese suppliers overall. 
These issues need further attention in future research. 
1.4.3  Further Tests 
We  performed  a number  of other tests, the results of which are not 
shown. These do merit some discussion. We  also hypothesized that the 
characteristics of the local market may have an impact on the local con- 
tent of manufacturing operations. The more sophisticated the demand for 
electronic goods, the more firms will  be inclined to adapt and redesign 
products for the local market, which may also involve a switch to higher 
value-added components produced locally. We used as a measure of de- 
mand sophistication, MARKET, the value of electronics sales in the coun- 
try in 1992 (taken from Elsevier 1995) per capita. Market sophistication 
may moderate the effect of LOCSALES: the more sophisticated market 
demand, the more the market resembles the major export markets (the 
European Union, the United States, and Japan) and the smaller the effect 
of differences in local versus export sales strategy. The cross-effect of LOC- 
SALES and MARKET had the expected negative sign but was not sig- 
nificant. 
Another test involved adding a dummy variable that takes the value one 
if the investing firm is a core firm in the vertical keiretsu. The results did 
not support the hypothesis that core firms behave differently from member 
firms. Another consideration was that in the country dummy model, the 
strict regulations in China linking export and import requirements could 
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bias the effect of LOCSALES: the regulations are likely to increase the ef- 
fect of LOCSALES on the local content ratio, compared with other Asian 
countries. We  included a cross-effect of the  China dummy with  LOC- 
SALES. The coefficient was positive, as expected, but not significant. 
We  tested whether we  could find evidence that transfer-pricing issues 
are affecting reported local content ratios. Affiliates located in host coun- 
tries with higher tax rates may  have an incentive to engage in transfer 
pricing and report a higher value of imports from the parent firm (and 
hence a lower local content ratio). We calculated host countries’ effective 
tax rates by taking the pretax current profit minus after-tax current profit 
divided by  pretax current profit for all Japanese subsidiaries reporting in 
the 1992 MITI ~urvey.’~  We included this effective tax rate as an explana- 
tory variable in an attempt to control for the effects of transfer pricing. 
The variable had a counterintuitive positive sign but was not significant, 
while the other coefficients remained unchanged. 
A last test involved substituting the local procurement ratio (local pro- 
curement divided by  total procurement) for the local content ratio as the 
dependent variable in the model. The estimated effects were very  similar 
to those in the local content ratio models. The one important difference 
was that the country-specific measure of local content rules, REGULA- 
TION, did reach conventional significance levels in the model of equation 
(8). We took this result as further confirmation that local content rules in 
Asia have an impact on vertical linkages. 
1.5  Conclusions 
We  examined the determinants of the vertical linkages, that is, the local 
content (intrasubsidiary value added and procurement of inputs from lo- 
cally established suppliers), of  157 Asian subsidiaries of Japanese multi- 
national firms in the electronics industry in 1992. Consistent with our the- 
oretical considerations, we found that a number of characteristics, both at 
the parent firm level and at the subsidiary level, affect subsidiaries’ local 
content ratios. Operating experience has a positive effect on the local con- 
tent ratio. As subsidiaries gain operating experience in the local economy, 
they are able to deepen their vertical linkages. This result  is  consistent 
with the notion that the alleged lack of vertical linkages of Japanese multi- 
national firms is the result of a “vintage effect”: the relatively late interna- 
tionalization of Japanese firms. However, the magnitude of the estimated 
experience effect is too small to take these results as more than a partial 
confirmation of  the vintage effect explanation. The results indicate that 
13. This gave us the following rates: Hong Kong, 0.138; Korea, 0.348; Singapore, 0.192; 
Taiwan, 0.207; Indonesia, 0.286; Malaysia, 0.1 12; Thailand, 0.369; Philippines, 0.217; and 
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acquired subsidiaries are  more  integrated  into  the local  economy  and 
have higher local content ratios than greenfield subsidiaries. Subsidiaries 
of  R&D-intensive parents  rely  more  strongly on imports of  (nonstan- 
dardized) components designed by the parent and have lower local con- 
tent ratios. Subsidiaries located in the ASEAN-4 countries and China that 
sell a high percentage of manufactured output on the host market reach 
higher local content levels than export-oriented subsidiaries. A local market 
orientation is likely to be associated with the use of mature and standardized 
low-cost components procured from locally established suppliers, whereas 
an orientation  toward  sophisticated  export  markets is  associated  with 
technology-intensive components that are not typically available locally. 
Membership of  the parent firm in  a vertical  keiretsu  with  intensive 
supplier-assembler relationships has a robust positive impact on local con- 
tent. We ascribed this to the ability of keiretsu members to stimulate the 
creation of a network of keiretsu component and parts manufacturers in 
host economies, which helps them to achieve higher local content levels. 
Apparently, this effect offsets a possible negative effect of keiretsu relation- 
ships on local content that may be due to the higher costs involved when 
switching to overseas suppliers outside the keiretsu.  However, we  could 
not establish with the data available that keiretsu firms reach higher local 
content in countries with a greater presence of Japanese suppliers. 
Host country local content regulations have a positive and significant 
effect if measured at the subsidiary level but not if a more general measure 
is used at the country level. This finding is consistent with the observation 
that although there are few formal local content rules in Asian countries, 
preferential investment status programs give governments the discretion- 
ary power to demand changes in procurement behavior on a case by case 
basis. It should be noted, though, that the finding that local content re- 
quirements have been capable of changing procurement behavior does not 
tell us whether the benefits of these policies have outweighed their costs. 
Achievement of local content targets comes at the price of  tax relief or 
investment subsidies, and perhaps more important, there is evidence that 
local content requirements reduce the total volume of foreign investment 
(Hackett and Srinivasan 1998). 
In general, our attempt to establish the effects of host country charac- 
teristics on local content was less successful, which may  be due to the 
limited number of  countries represented in our sample. We  did find that 
the size of the host country electronic parts and component manufactur- 
ing  sector combined  with  the  availability of  good  local  infrastructure 
raises the local content of Japanese subsidiaries. 
This study is a first attempt to shed some light on the determinants of 
vertical linkages by Japanese firms. In order to allow a better assessment 
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as the role of keiretsu supplier linkages, it may be necessary in future re- 
search to distinguish between local procurement from Japanese subsidiar- 
ies and local procurement from locally owned ~upp1iers.l~  In addition, the 
effect of overseas supplier networks of vertical keiretsu should be analyzed 
directly by measuring the size of these networks for each keiretsu in each 
country. We  are planning to examine these networks by  combining the 
available information on keiretsu membership with databases on overseas 
subsidiaries. We expect that this approach will provide us with more ro- 
bust evidence concerning the interaction of keiretsu linkages, local supply 
infrastructure, and local content. We are also planning to remedy the lim- 
ited variation  in host country characteristics by  extending the study to 
more countries and, possibly, by  adding data on local content and host 
country variables in 1995. An extension to 1995 is of interest because evi- 
dence exists that local procurement in Asia increased between 1992 and 
1995 (MITI 1998a). 
Another avenue for further research is to change the focus from the host 
country level to the regional level. In order to gain insight into the role of 
“regional core networks” in East Asia and their importance in Asian trade 
and industrial development, a perspective is needed that takes into ac- 
count procurements from other Asian countries (excluding Japan). As can 
be seen from table 1.2, procurements from other Asian countries are not 
unimportant. 
Japanese subsidiaries appear to have been quick to adjust to changing 
economic conditions after the Asian economic crisis in the summer of 
1997. According to a recent MITI survey, Japan’s manufacturing subsidi- 
aries in the ASEAN-4 countries reduced their investment in tangible fixed 
assets by 21 percent and increased their exports to Japan by  11 percent 
from the last quarter of 1996 to the last quarter of 1997 (yen-based figures; 
MITI 1998b). Such changes are bound to have a substantial impact on 
procurement behavior. There are some indications that the increased cost 
of imported components due to the depreciation of Asian currencies has 
spurred firms to increase local proc~rement.’~  More insight concerning 
the procurement strategies of Japanese firms may be obtained by investi- 
gating changes in vertical linkages throughout the 1990s. We hope to be 
able to contribute to research in this area in the future. 
14. It may be possible to study such local linkages in the future because MITI is planning 
to introduce such a distinction in the 1999 survey. 
15. E.g., Hitachi Consumer Products in Thailand reportedly plans to raise the local con- 
tent of its washing machine manufacturing operations from 43 percent (in early  1998) to 
85 percent within a year. See “Local Procurement Up in Southeast Asia,” Nikkei  Weekly, 
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Appendix 
Data Sources, Selection, and Description of Variables 
Data Selection 
Our data on local procurement and intrasubsidiary value added of over- 
seas manufacturing subsidiaries of Japanese electronics firms are taken 
from MITI’s fifth Basic Survey on Foreign Direct Investment (MITI 1994) 
and concern fiscal year 1992 (the year ending 31 March 1993). This MITI 
survey includes a total of 314 subsidiaries in East Asia. For a relatively 
large number of subsidiaries, the information on local procurement and 
procurement by region of origin was incomplete, and a first screening re- 
duced the number of observations to 203. We further eliminated subsidiar- 
ies with fewer than ten employees and a few cases in which the data were 
unreliable (e.g., the value of  total  procurement exceeded that  of  total 
sales). This diminished the number of observations by  15, and we  ended 
up with reliable information for a sample of 188 firms. 
We  matched these data with information on parent firms using fiscal 
year 1992 financial data from published financial reports (MOF 1993) for 
firms listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange and Toyo Keizai’s Nihon no 
Kigyou Guruupu (for keiretsu membership). We could not establish the par- 
ent firms of all Asian subsidiaries, and R&D and keiretsu information on 
parents was not available for all subsidiaries. This reduced the number of 
observations to 157 in the basic country dummy model and further, to 140, 
in models that included the keiretsu variable. The data on host country 
characteristics from Business International do not include information on 
China, which further reduced the sample to 133 in the country variable 
model, and the presence of Japanese suppliers could not be established for 
5 more observations, reducing the number of observations to 128. 
Variable Definitions 
Table 1A.  1 provides the definitions of the variables and the data sources. Table lA.l 
Variable  Definition  Source 




















Local content ratio: (total sales - total imports) / (total sales - 
Parent firm R&D ratio: parent firm R&D expenditure / total sales 
1 
1,  5 
2 
imports of finished goods) 
Intensity of supplier-assembler relationships within the vertical 
keiretsu in Japan; paid-in capital of the core keiretsu firm’s 
manufacturing-related companies in Japan / paid-in capital of 
the core keiretsu firm. Core firms have at least 250 billion yen 
in sales. 
Greenfield and 100% Japanese equity share (reference case) 





Telecommunications and computers 
Electronic parts 
Other electronic devices 
Operating experience: number of months of production since start  1 
1 
of operations until March 1993 
that takes value I  if subsidiary reports that it faced such 
requirements 
Subsidiary-specific local content requirements: dummy variable 
Local sales ratio: sales in host country / total sales  1 
3 
1,  3 
Size of local supply industry of electronic parts and components: 
natural log of host country’s production of electronic parts 
Presence of Japanese-owned suppliers in the local supply industry: 
natural log of total sales by Japanese subsidiaries 
manufacturing electronic parts / natural log of total production 
of host country electronic parts industry 
Quality of infrastructure: indicated on a 0-10  range 
Strictness of local content requirements and restrictions on 
4 
4 
component and material imports: indicated on a 0-10  range, 
where 0 means no regulation, 10 strict regulation 
Sources: (1) MITI (1994). (2) Toyo Keizai Shinpousha, Nihon no Kigyou Guruupu (Japanese corporate 
groups; Tokyo, 1990). (3) Elsevier (1995). (4) Business International (1989). (5) MOF (1993). 38  RenC  Belderbos, Giovanni Capannelli, and Kyoji Fukao 
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Comment  Toshihiko Hayashi 
FDI is expected to be an important vehicle by which technology and know- 
how are transmitted from a home country to a host country. The transmis- 
sion mechanism is  commonly called spillover, perhaps  borrowing from 
the similar concept well established in the local public finance literature. 
Belderbos, Capannelli, and Fukao (BCF) are interested in how the extent 
to which such spillover takes place varies among individual subsidiaries 
and what factors determine the scope of spillovers. BCF are also concerned 
with how Japanese FDI fares in Asia in this regard because it is often ob- 
served that Japanese subsidiaries in Asia are less likely to generate spillovers 
to local economies than are subsidiaries from other home countries. 
Two contrasting hypotheses have been advanced to account for the al- 
leged lack of enthusiasm for linkages in Japanese subsidiaries: the idiosyn- 
crasy hypothesis and the vintage hypothesis. The idiosyncrasy hypothesis 
says that idiosyncratic behavior  on  the part of Japanese  multinational 
corporations-reflecting  keiretsu-oriented or inward-looking attitudes- 
leads to less interaction with local industrial communities in the host coun- 
try, and thus less spillover. The vintage hypothesis says, to the contrary, that 
the idiosyncrasies are only temporary. The basic reason for less involvement 
by Japanese subsidiaries is simply that they are relatively new to the host 
country and hence less experienced. As vintage develops Japanese subsidi- 
aries will gain experience in dealing with the local business community 
and workforce, deepening vertical linkages and increasing spillovers. 
In my view, BCF’s study reported here is no doubt an important con- 
tribution to this debate, although other facets of their findings merit no 
less recognition. Making use of the data set Basic Survey on Foreign Direct 
Investment, published by MITI in 1994, BCF try to decipher the relation 
between the local content ratio of Japanese electronics manufacturing sub- 
sidiaries and the characteristics of the parent company as well as the sub- 
sidiaries themselves. Through their methodologically sound and laborious 
work, several interesting findings emerge. 
BCF Findings 
BCF define local content to include “both the value added of manufac- 
turing (in-house production of components) and the value of components 
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and materials sourced from local (Japanese and third party owned, as well 
as locally owned) suppliers.” They take this measure of local content and 
divide it by total sales of the subsidiary to get the local content ratio. By 
means of a Tobit model with the local content ratio as dependent variable 
and R&D intensity, intensity of supplier-assembler relationships (keiret- 
su), vintage, and other factors as explanatory variables, BCF obtain some 
very interesting results. Three of the most interesting findings are as fol- 
lows: 
1.  Their prior conjecture that the parent firm’s R&D intensity nega- 
tively affects the local content ratio is empirically verified. Their results 
give support to the view that “R&D-intensive firms make greater use of 
nonstandardized and technology-intensive components, often developed 
and produced by the firm in Japan.” 
2.  Keiretsu intensity has a positive sign and is highly significant in their 
estimates, suggesting that “keiretsu linkages have a major impact on verti- 
cal integration  and local procurement.” BCF ascribe this finding to the 
“ability of keiretsu members to stimulate the creation of a network of keir- 
etsu component and parts manufacturers in host economies, which helps 
them to achieve higher local content levels.” 
3.  Operating experience has a positive effect on the local content ratio. 
From this BCF confirm, albeit cautiously, that  the vintage effect is the 
cause of  the alleged lack  of  vertical linkage of Japanese multinational 
firms. 
Suggested Research Agenda 
Though BCF’s findings are extremely interesting by themselves, I would 
learn more if they followed up their analyses along the lines suggested below. 
In the course of their analyses BCF carefully distinguish the factors that 
affect the parent firm side and those that affect the subsidiary side. How- 
ever, their final estimation is based on a kind of reduced-form model. It 
would help me understand the nature of the problem better if  they pre- 
sented a structural form model and obtained estimates for structural co- 
efficients. 
If BCF had shifted from econometrics to case studies to substantiate 
their analyses, they would have encountered a richer reality. For example, 
they make use of the ratings given by US. multinational firms provided by 
Business International to proxy an explanatory variable, REGULATION. 
Though it may tell us something about the country-wise degree of freedom 
to invest, the index seems to provide only tangential information if any to 
the parent firm contemplating FDI. It seems to be often the case that for 
Japanese firms searching for investment opportunities, the choice is be- 
tween Dalian and Shanghai rather than between China and India. And if 
the chosen location is Dalian, should it be downtown Dalian or the Eco- 
nomic and Technological Development Zone in the suburbs? Local Content of Japanese Electronics Manufacturing  43 
Policy Implication 
This leads me to the question BCF pose at the outset. They seem to be 
concerned with the spillover effects that FDI is expected to bring to the 
host country. However, their  study concentrates on the degree of local 
content of foreign subsidiaries, based on the hypothesis that higher local 
content will be correlated with greater spillover effects. 
It goes without saying that the degree of vertical linkage is an important 
piece of information. However, from a policy perspective, it would be just 
as important to know whether spillovers are taking place in the market. 
The question is whether spillovers are a case of pecuniary externalities or 
a case of technical externalities. 
If vertical linkages create increased demand for local products and la- 
bor, which induces or encourages productivity-enhancing measures in in- 
digenous industry, the host country government would have to be con- 
cerned with the amount of higher linkage FDI and little else. 
However, if spillovers are more technical in nature, such as foreign sub- 
sidiaries acting as role models, demonstration effects, or increased oppor- 
tunities for local spinoffs, the presence and the magnitude of FDI itself 
would be important. In that case it may be necessary for the host country 
government to encourage or give  additional incentives to foreign firms 
with greater or lesser degrees of linkage to invest in the host country. Also, 
the role of Japanese electronics manufacturing subsidiaries in Asia would 
have to be evaluated in this context as well. 
Comment  Lee Branstetter 
I found this to be an extremely interesting, original, and ambitious paper. 
Belderbos, Capannelli, and Fukao, individually and together, have been 
among the most important and prolific contributors to the burgeoning 
literature on the economic analysis of Japanese FDI at the micro level. 
This paper is an important addition to that record of research, and I be- 
lieve that the research agenda that grows out of this paper will yield many 
interesting results. I should also note that I am quite envious of the wealth 
of data to which these authors have been allowed access. 
The authors begin by noting that economists have little systematic evi- 
dence  on  the  determinants  of  local  sourcing activity by  multinational 
firms. The authors utilize unusually rich data collected by  the Japanese 
General Management and Coordination Agency that is rarely provided to 
outside researchers. This data set includes information at the subsidiary 
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level on local sourcing and other variables, information on parent firms, 
and information on keiretsu linkages among parent firms and their affili- 
ates. The authors then analyze the determinants of local sourcing at the 
micro level, using Tobit regression techniques. They find some results con- 
sistent with their initial predictions.  I found the empirical work in the 
paper to have been well executed, and I do not question the results. There- 
fore, I will actually concentrate most of my initial remarks not on the body 
of the paper but on the motivation outlined in the first few pages. 
One important element of that motivation can be summarized as fol- 
lows.  A primary  benefit of  FDI is technology  spillover or technology 
transfer from the multinational firm to host country enterprises. However, 
the amount of technology spillover that actually accrues to the host coun- 
try may depend in part on the “embeddedness” of Japanese subsidiaries 
in Asia. Therefore, in order to get a sense of the long-term benefits of Jap- 
anese FDI for the host countries, one needs to look at this embeddedness, 
as measured by the local sourcing activity of Japanese affiliates at the sub- 
sidiary level. These views are not unique to these authors. In fact, similar 
views color much of the current debate among policymakers concerning 
the costs and benefits of FDI in developing countries. The authors also 
contend that even if the link between embeddedness and technology trans- 
fer is not so strong or direct, the economics of local procurement arc an 
interesting and important topic. 
I think that technology spillovers and technology transfer  are fascin- 
ating and important phenomena. My own contribution to this volume, 
chapter 4, examines the role Japanese FDI may have played in fostering 
R&D spillovers between Japan and the United States. However, “tradi- 
tional” international economic analysis emphasizes other benefits of FDI, 
which have little to do, at least directly, with technology or embeddedness. 
Viewed through that analytical lens, the chief benefit of FDI is the same 
as the chief benefit of trade: namely, the ability to obtain goods (or factor 
services) at lower opportunity cost than that available under autarky.’ The 
additional benefit from FDI over trade is that a capital-scarce country can 
obtain the factor services of capital directly (and more cheaply) even when 
the indirect trade of factor services through trade in goods may be limited 
or may fail to achieve factor price equalization.2  With a free trade and in- 
vestment regime, the resource cost of a given basket of consumption goods 
is likely to decline substantially, and the saved resources can be reallocated 
to other sectors in which their marginal product is higher. 
1. Helpman and Krugman (1985) presented this sort of model in a useful form. 
2. To  be more precise, one can construct an equilibrium in which trade in goods alone 
fails to bring about factor price equalization. However, allowing for FDI pushes the global 
economy toward factor price equalization, allowing the capital-scarce country access to the 
factor services of capital at the new world price, which would be lower than the price avail- 
able under autarky or free trade without FDI. If there is some natural or artificial barrier to 
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These are, if  you will, the direct  benefits of FDI. These benefits are 
likely to be substantial. Furthermore, these benefits do not depend on 
embeddedness, as the authors have acknowledged. In fact, embeddedness 
could impede this kind of benefit. Let us consider the following example. 
Imagine that a Japanese auto producer decides to establish a manufactur- 
ing subsidiary within a certain country. Let us further imagine that this 
producer is “forced” to source parts and services from local firms, due to 
restrictive local content requirements. Now, these restrictions are designed 
to raise the embeddedness of the Japanese firm. However, these restric- 
tions, by forcing the Japanese firm to rely on high-cost, inefficient domes- 
tic producers, could actually raise the price and lower the quantity (and 
quality) of the final good sold by the Japanese firm in the domestic market. 
Attempts to increase embeddedness could actually reduce the welfare of 
the host country. This speaks to the “less benign view” of Japanese FDI 
mentioned  by  the authors. I am concerned that Japanese firms in Asia 
may be unfairly criticized for an insufficient level of embeddedness, and 
the response to this criticism could very well be something that winds up 
making the host country worse off rather than better 
Even if we were to focus solely on the benefits brought by FDI through 
improved levels of productivity  in  the host country industry, these can 
arise through multiple channels, as the authors have acknowledged. One 
potential channel is,  of course, technology transfer to local firms in the 
host country through the sorts of supply chain relationships stressed in 
this paper. However, it is also true that simply through their presence in 
the host country market, Japanese affiliates can bring about improved pro- 
ductivity in the host country at the industry and firm level by  raising the 
level of competitive pressure on domestic incumbents. The least efficient 
local firms are forced out of the market, and the more efficient local firms 
are forced to become yet more efficient in order to withstand the competi- 
tive pressure of the foreign affiliates. This competition improves resource 
allocation within the host country industry and raises the level of produc- 
tivity, even if  supply relationships  with  domestic firms are completely 
absent  .4 
Having pointed out that important benefits from FDI will accrue to the 
host country even in the absence of local sourcing, we  can also question 
the extent to which foreign affiliates can be expected to function as chan- 
nels of technology spillover or technology transfer. This is something the 
authors acknowledge, but it is also a point worth reemphasizing. Using 
microlevel data and careful econometric analysis, Haddad and Harrison 
3. I do not mean to imply here that the linkages between multinationals and domestic 
firms are unimportant. For a theoretical treatment that formalizes the concept of “linkages” 
and highlights their potential importance, see Rodriguez-Clare (1996). 
4. This point has been raised by a number of other researchers, including Richard Caves 
(1 974). 46  Ren6 Belderbos, Giovanni CapanneUi, and Kyoji Fukao 
(1993) and Aitken and Harrison (1999) found no evidence that the pres- 
ence of  foreign affiliates accelerated the productivity growth of domestic 
firms in Morocco and Venezuela. In fact, the latter paper found a negative 
effect of the presence of foreign affiliates on domestic firm productivity 
in Venezuela. This seems to at least call into question the view that tech- 
nology transfer or spillover is an important or inevitable consequence of 
multinational activity in the host country industry. 
In a similar fashion, we  might also question whether technology spill- 
overs are proportional to the density of commercial transactions, as the 
authors suggest. To  illustrate this point, let me  use a trivial example. I 
purchase much more from my  physician, my  landlord, and my mechanic 
than I do from other economists. Yet  I receive relatively little in the way 
of “knowledge spillovers” or technology transfer from these transactions. 
On the other hand, I purchase very little from my fellow economists, yet I 
learn a great deal from reading their papers and interacting with them at 
conferences. Now let me note a more substantive example, which the au- 
thors also mention. Chung, Mitchell, and Yeung (1996) investigated the 
impact of Japanese FDI in the U.S. auto component industry using plant- 
level data. They found that the increased Japanese FDI in this industry 
after  1985 was associated with increased productivity growth. However, 
the productivity of  U.S. component plants supplying Japanese assembly 
plants grew more slowly  than that of  firms with no ties to the Japanese 
plants. Here embeddedness actually apparently retarded the technological 
development of plants with closer supply relationships. Chung et al. con- 
cluded that the positive impact on productivity identified in the data was 
due to competitive pressure from Japanese entrants rather than technol- 
ogy transfer mediated through supply relationships. 
Now let us turn briefly to the definition of the dependent variable. The 
numerator of the authors’ measure of local sourcing, LOCON, is simply 
the value of subsidiary sales minus the value of imported parts and com- 
ponents. This measure does not distinguish between the subsidiaries’ own 
production and the sourcing of parts to local (i.e., host country owned) 
firms, as the authors freely acknowledge. My  own  concern is  that this 
measure could differ between countries for reasons that have little or noth- 
ing to do with “sourcing strategy.” For instance, let us say that Japanese 
affiliates in one host country experience a surge in overall domestic de- 
mand that drives up demand for the output of the affiliates in that country. 
This increase in demand could be met partly by  an increase in price (and 
profits). This leads to a larger measured level  of  local sourcing in  this 
country even though the local sourcing strategy has not changed. In con- 
trast, let us suppose that the currency of a second host country depreciates 
with respect to the Japanese yen. This means that the value of imported 
components relative to the local currency value of sales will be higher, and 
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case before the currency fluctuation. However, the sourcing strategy has 
not ~hanged.~  In more general terms, the authors’ inference is limited by 
sample size and by the use of a single cross section. 
However, it is clear that this data source and the authors’ basic ap- 
proach could yield substantial insights with data from more than one year. 
This would allow for the use of panel data techniques. The authors could 
focus on differences in behavior of a given affiliate over time, allowing for 
a more precise identification of the kind of relations the authors are seek- 
ing to examine. The authors also suggest that their data could provide 
some insight into the development of the East Asian financial and eco- 
nomic crisis, and I heartily agree. It is probably obvious to every partici- 
pant in this conference that the speed with which that crisis is resolved 
and its ultimate human and financial cost will depend in a vital way  on 
the response of the Japanese firms operating in these countries. The au- 
thors’ data and approach are tailor-made for examining the evolution of 
this response across industries and countries. Such an examination could 
provide crucial information for policymakers and academics alike, and I 
hope that the authors are able to proceed in this direction as soon as pos- 
sible. 
Again, I feel that this is an interesting and important paper. I look for- 
ward to future work by the authors along these lines. 
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